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Recent Decisions
Appeal - Voluntary Dismissal Of In Banc Proceeding
Not An Election Precluding Appeal. State Roads Commission of Maryland v. Smith, 224 Md. 537, 168 A. 2d 705
(1961). The State Roads Commission, in a condemnation
case, properly reserved points for the consideration of the
court in banc and a bill of exceptions was filed in support
thereof. Before the case came before the court in bane,
the State Roads Commission obtained an order dismissing
its bill of exceptions "without prejudice," and then filed
an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellee contended
that the invocation of procedure for the review of points
by the court sitting in banc constituted an election of remedies and barred an appeal, notwithstanding the abandonment of the proceeding before any decision or hearing.
The Court of Appeals held that the mere initiation of proceeding for review by a court in bane did not constitute
such an election as to preclude an appeal.
Generally under Maryland's constitutionally provided
in bane procedure a party against whom an adverse ruling
is made during a term of the Circuit Court, may, in any
of the counties, but not Baltimore City, upon motion,
reserve questions for the consideration of three judges of
the Circuit, who constitute a court in bane. MARYLAND CONSTITUTION,

Art. IV, § 22. Although seldom used it has long

been recognized that the in bane proceeding is a substitution for an appeal, and the decision of the judges sitting
in bane is conclusive as against the party at whose direction the points were reserved. Costigin v. Bond, 65 Md.
122, 3 A. 285 (1886); Board of Medical Examiners v.
Steward, 207 Md. 108, 113 A. 2d 426 (1955). The Court in
the instant case pointed out that there is no provision in
the State Constitution, nor any previous Maryland case
law controlling the issue presented. However, as Maryland has adhered to the rules that the mere institution of
suit, without going to judgment, does not preclude an
alternate remedy, Hamlin Mach. Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co.,
197 Md. 148, 78 A. 2d 450 (1951), the Court found that the
appeal was not precluded in the instant case.
The few decisions found on the precise point presented
in the instant case were pre-twentieth century cases which
arrived at holdings contrary to the result reached by the
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Maryland Court, Field v. Great Western Elevator Co., 6
N.D. 424, 71 N.W. 135 (1897), but these decisions were not
looked on by the Maryland Court as controlling its interpretation as applied to this rather unique appellate procedure (Cf. 18 Am. Jur. 149, Election of Remedies § 28,
which the Court refused to follow). See, MD. RULES 520;
4 C.J.S. 119, Appeal and Error, § 27; 6 A.L.R. 2d 20 (1949);
7 M.L.E. 54, Courts, § 75.
Collateral Estoppel - Subsequent Perjury Conviction
Not Precluded By Acquittal In Prior Criminal Trial.
Adams v. United States, 287 F. 2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961).
Defendants, who were criminally charged with possession
of moonshine whiskey, gave testimony asserting their
presence at a party 100 miles away from the scene of the
crime. After the jury were charged that if they believed
the alibi, they must acquit the defendants, and after they
were given the usual directions to acquit unless they believed the government had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury acquitted the defendants. The defendants' alibi testimony was the subject of the instant
prosecution and conviction for perjury. On appeal, the
defendants claimed that the prior acquittal on the substantive charge adjudicated the alibi issue in their favor
and that res judicata or collateral estoppel precluded its
relitigation at the perjury trial. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the perjury conviction after finding that the jury could
have based its prior acquittal on the failure of the government to prove its case rather than on a belief in the alibi.
The Court held that since the alibi issue was not necessarily determined in the prior trial, its subsequent reexamination in the instant case was not error.
While the great weight of authority applies res judicata
principles to criminal proceedings, a former acquittal
generally does not preclude a subsequent perjury prosecution. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951); 147
A.L.R. 991 (1943). A statement in 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
(5th ed. 1925) § 648, p. 1364, often quoted by courts in support of similar holdings, succinctly expresses the rule:
"the previous judgment is conclusive only as to those
matters which were in fact in issue and actually or necessarily adjudicated." In denying pleas of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, the courts reason: (1) that public policy
should discourage perjury by not immunizing defendants
from subsequent prosecution; Jay v. State, 15 Ala. App.
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255, 73 So. 137 (1916), cert. den. 73 So. 1000 (1916); and
(2) that criminal acquittals often do not necessarily de-

termine precise facts. 2 FREEMAN,

JUDGMENTS

(5th ed.

1925) § 649, p. 1367; State v. Coblentz, 169 Md. 159, 167,
180 A. 266 (1935). While the Maryland Court of Appeals in
dicta has recognized that in some sense res judicata is a
defense in successive criminal prosecutions, it has held
that the plea is only available where the essential elementary proof in both offenses are similar. State v.
Coblentz, supra; Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310, 93 A. 2d
753 (1953). Cases are collected in Annot. 95 L. Ed. 755
(1951), 147 A.L.R. 991 (1943), and 37 A.L.R. 1290 (1925).
See also Gershenson, Res Judicata in Successive Criminal
Prosecutions, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 12 (1957).
Constitutional Law - Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law Declared Unconstitutional. People v. Nothaus,
........ Colo . ........ , 363 P. 2d 180 (1961). Defendant while
driving his automobile collided with a horse. The accident
was reported to the Motor Vehicle Division of the Department of Revenue. Since the defendant was not within one

of the exceptions to the Colorado Financial Responsibility
Act (2 C.R.S. (1953) 13-7-7), the Director of Revenue,
pursuant to the Act, sent the defendant a notice informing
him that he must deposit security in an amount which was
sufficient in the Director's estimation to satisfy any judgment which might be obtained against him as a result of
the accident, or in the alternative face summary suspension of his driver's license. The defendant failed to comply
with the notice, and as required by the Act his license was
summarily suspended. Defendant was subsequently tried
and convicted by a Justice of the Peace for driving while
under the suspension order. He appealed to a county
court, and his conviction was reversed on the grounds that
2 C.R.S. (1953) 13-7-7 was unconstitutional in violation of
the Due Process Clause, which reversed was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Colorado in an 5-2 decision. The
majority found that ownership of an automobile was an
inalienable property right, which included the use of the
state's public highways, and that while this right could
be reasonably restricted within the state's police power, it
could not be revoked without providing the motoristowner with an opportunity for judicial determination of
whether sufficient grounds existed for revocation. The dissent pointed out that the statute was within the state's
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police power since it attempted to make certain that a
motorist would not become involved in two accidents and
be financially irresponsible in both.
The majority of states have enacted financial responsibility acts, with many of these state acts containing sections
identical to the statute attacked in the instant case. 35
A.L.R. 1011 (1954). In construing these statutes courts
have consistently held that the suspension of an automobile license without a hearing does not violate due process,
since the right to a license and to its continued enjoyment
after issuance is merely a privilege extended by the state.
Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W. 2d 620, 35 A.L.R.
2d 1003 (1952); Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A.
701 (1938). While Maryland has a statute similar to the
one at issue in the instant case (6 MD. CODE (1957) Art.
66 , § 122), no Maryland case has been found wherein this
statute's constitutionality has been challenged. For further
reference see: 3 M.L.E. 326, Automobiles, § 75; 115 A.L.R.
1376 (1938); Comment, Survey of FinancialResponsibility
Laws, 20 N.C.L. Rev. 198 (1942); and in general, 1 DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (1958) ch. 7, §§ 7.08-7.12,
7.18-7.20.
Contracts - Rescission Of Government Surplus Sale
Denied Where Mistake Went To The Description, Not To
The Identity Of Goods. DadourianExport Corporation v.
United States, 291 F. 2d 178 (2d Cir. 1961). The plaintiff
bid on government surplus described in an invitation to
bid as "Nets, Cargo,... Manila rope." The invitation urged
all bidders to inspect the property prior to submitting
bids and warned that, "In no case will failure to inspect
constitute grounds for a claim or for the withdrawal of
a bid after opening." Under the general sale terms and
conditions which accompanied the invitation the goods
were offered on an "as is and where is" basis, the invitation
stating, that "The description is based on the best available information, but the Government makes no guaranty,
warranty, or representation, expressed or implied, as to
quantity, kind, character, quality ... or description." Although the goods were available for inspection, the plaintiff did not inspect. After his bid was accepted, it was
discovered that the nets were "saveall" rather than "cargo"
and that a substantial number of them were not made of
manila, but of an inferior quality rope. Having lost his
appeal to the Armed Services Board of Contract Ap-
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peals, plaintiff sued in the District Court under 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1346 (a) (2) (1950) for rescission or a price adjustment.
The Government counterclaimed for monies due, and on
cross-motions for summary judgment, the plaintiff's complaint was dismissed and the Government awarded its
counterclaim. The plaintiff appealed, contending that there
was a mutual mistake of fact as to the identity of the
subject matter. In a 2-1 decision the Second Circuit
denied rescission and a price adjustment, holding that the
mistake was merely descriptive, not going to the identity
of the subject matter, and that the disclaimer of warranty
covered this type of discrepancy.
Since the government's general sale terms and conditions expressly waive warranties as to kind, character,
quality or description, such sales contracts have been interpreted to compel the bidder to adequately inspect at his
peril. Paxton-Mitchell Company v. United States, 172 F.
Supp. 463 (Ct. of Cl. 1959); Maguire & Co. v. United States,
273 U.S. 67 (1927). Courts, in dictum, have stated that a
purchaser who buys from the government on these terms
is not required to accept oranges when he bid on apples,
United States v. Silverton, 200 F. 2d 824 (1st Cir. 1952);
Standard Magnesium Corporationv. United States, 241 F.
2d 677 (10th Cir. 1957). Reasoning from this analogy, the
Board of Contract Appeals has awarded a purchaser a
price adjustment where the Government offered "cushion,
leatherette" and tendered padded plywood seats, holding
that the discrepancy went to the identity, not merely to
the description of the subject matter. Tulsa Army & Navy
Store, 1960, A.S.B.C.A. No. 6449, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH)
2785.
See also: Krupp v. Federal Housing Administration, 285
F. 2d 833 (1st Cir. 1961). For general reference see: 1
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1936) § 95; 17 C.J.S.
497, Contracts, § 144; 5 M.L.E. 410, Contracts, § 75.
Criminal Law - Signing One's Own Name May Constitute Forgery. Nelson v. State, 224 Md. 374, 167 A. 2d 871
(1961). The defendant did business as an individual in
Baltimore under the trade name of The Nelson Company.
Over a five month period the defendant received seven
checks, totaling approximately thirty-six thousand dollars
from the Glenn L. Martin Co. These checks, while intended
for another Baltimore company by the same name, had been
addressed and sent through error to the defendant's company. Although realizing that these checks were not
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intended for him, the checks were endorsed at the defendant's direction with his firm's rubber stamp and deposited in his account, providing funds which he later
drew upon to pay his creditors. Defendant was convicted
in the trial court on counts of forgery and larceny. On appeal the Court of Appeals found it necessary to consider
only the forgery conviction and in rejecting defendant's
contention that he could not be guilty since he had signed
his own name, held that the writing of his own name with
intent to defraud constituted forgery.
Subject to statutory variations, to constitute forgery
there must be a "fraudulent making of a false writing having apparent legal significance." (378); PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW (1957) 291. Several people may have the same name.
A writing if made to appear the product of one of these,
when really it is the product of another, is false although
the words themselves may be words appropriate to describe
the true signer as well. Therefore it is generally held that
one may commit forgery by using his own name with the
intent to deceive. Parvin v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. R. 172,
103 S.W. 2d 773 (1937); Thurm v. Schupper, 204 N.Y.S. 2d
537 (1960). In Lyman v. State, 136 Md. 40, 109 A. 548
(1920), the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction of forgery for signing a fictitious name to
a check, reasoning that since the signing was made with
the intent to defraud, the crime of forgery had been committed even though the name was fictitious. For further
reference see: 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 44; 37 C.J.S. 38,
Forgery, § 9; 2 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (12th ed. 1932)
§ 864; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIMES (6th ed. 1958) § 12.34;
10 L.R.A. 779 (1891).
Husband And Wife - Interspousal Immunity Held Not
To Bar Tort Suit By Surviving Widow Against Husband's
Estate. Long v. Landy, ...... N.J ....... , 171 A. 2d 1 (1961).
Decedent husband was driving, with his wife as a passenger, when their automobile collided with another
vehicle. As a result of the collision the husband died and
the wife was rendered mentally incompetent. The wife's
guardian ad litem brought a negligence action against the
husband's estate, and after the administrator's motion for
summary judgment on the ground of interspousal immunity
was denied in a prior appeal, the jury found for the
surviving widow. The administrator appealed to the Appellate Division, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey certi-
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fled the instant appeal on its own motion. The Supreme
Court found that while New Jersey had adopted the
common-law doctrine of interspousal immunity by statute,
this doctrine merely barred suit for negligent injury between spouses and did not deny the existence of a right of
action. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court held
that the immunity doctrine did not preclude the wife's
action in the instant case, since the public policy considerations underlying the doctrine ceased to exist upon
the death of one spouse. The Court reasoned that after
such termination of the marital relation, there was no
fear of collusion between the parties or of marital disharmony.
The majority of jurisdictions, including Maryland, have
held that the Married Women's Property Acts have not
abrogated the common-law rule that one spouse may not
recover damages for negligent personal injuries against
the other. 43 A.L.R. 2d 632 (1955); Furstenburg v.
Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534 (1927). Where, as
in the instant case, one spouse is deceased, an increasing
number of courts have allowed tort actions by or against
the deceased's estate. Johnson v. People's First National
Bank & Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A. 2d 716 (1958); 28
A.L.R. 2d 662 (1953). Maryland, however, has adhered
to the common-law rule, Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536,
161 A. 2d 698 (1960), where the decedent wife's administrator in a wrongful death action was denied contribution
from the surviving husband based on interspousal immunity. The Court of Appeals, as contrasted with the
court in the instant case, reasoned that the immunity doctrine denied the existence of any right of action during the
marriage or following the death of one spouse and that
if any such right of action were to exist, it must be created
by the legislature. See: PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955)
§ 101; 130 A.L.R. 889 (1941); McCurdy, Torts Between
Personsin Domestic Relation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1030 (1930);
12 M.L.E. 79, 146, Husband & Wife, §§ 55, 143.
Mandamus - Writ Lies To Vacate Acquittal Where
Court Terminated Government Case In Mid-Course. In Re
United States, 286 F. 2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961). Defendants
were charged with conspiring to falsify tests of equipment
being manufactured for the government. The second witness for the government was asked as many questions by
the trial judge as by his counsel. The third witness while
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still on direct examination conferred with the U.S. Attorney
during overnight recess. The trial Judge after stating
that this conference was a deprivation of defendants' civil
rights, and declaring the two witnesses' testimony unworthy of belief, responded to motions for acquittal and
directed the jury to return verdicts of not guilty. The
U.S. petitioned for a writ of mandamus to set aside the
judgment alleging that the trial judge had exceeded his
power in preventing the presentation of material evidence.
The Court of Appeals, recognizing that no appeal lay from
the criminal acquittal and that mandamus could not be
substituted for appeal, nevertheless held that as the judge
was without jurisdiction (power) to terminate the presentation by the United States of its case in mid-course,
mandamus lay to correct the error. The Court noted that
while the writ was not proper to correct mere error in
judicial discretion, it was available to correct usurpation
of power, DeBeers Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,
217 (1945).
Although mandamus is a discretionary writ, the Supreme Court has been consistent in issuing it where it is
clear that a lower court had no power either in doing what
it did, Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916), or in
failing to do that which it was required to do, Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880). While it is settled that the
writ will not lie to control a discretionary power conferred
on a lower tribunal, Ex Parte Newman, 14 Wall. (U.S.)
152, 166 (1872), Ex Parte Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 101
U.S. 711, 720 (1880), the Supreme Court has also found
mandamus proper when such discretion was abused.
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926). The Maryland Court
of Appeals in Miles v. Stevenson, 80 Md. 358, 365, 30 A.
646 (1894) held that mandamus was proper where a lower
tribunal had acted in excess of its power, and further
stated in dictum that while the writ is not a remedy to
correct an exercise of discretion, it could lie to rectify a
manifest abuse thereof. In the instant case the court preferred to rest its decision on a finding that the trial judge
had no power to act as he did, rather than finding that he
had abused his judicial discretion. See 35 Am. Jur. 31,
Mandamus, §§ 259, 260; 82 A.L.R. 1163 (1933); 14 M.L.E.
475, Mandamus § 23; Sloss, Mandamus in the Supreme
Court Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
91 (1932). Cf. 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
(1958) ch. 23, §§ 23.09-23.12.
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Negligence - Doctrine Of Governmental Immunity
Judicially Abolished. Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961). Plaintiff's declaration alleged that she was a paying patient being treated at
a state district hospital and that she sustained injury due
to the staff's negligent performance of its ministerial
duties. The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer
on the ground that the defendant hospital, as a state
agency, performing a governmental function, was immune
from tort liability. On appeal, the California Supreme
Court in a 5-2 decision reversed and held that this state
district hospital was not immune for torts for which its
agents were liable. Noting that the court had been expending the area of the state's proprietary activities and
the legislature had from time to time waived immunity
in certain specific areas, the court, after a re-evaluation of
the history and basis for the rule, concluded that the
whole rule of governmental immunity from tort liability
"must be discarded as mistaken and unjust". Though
faced with its own recent decision exactly on point and
contra to the holding in the instant case, Talley v. Northern
San Diego County Hospital Dist., 41 Cal. 2d 33, 257 P. 2d
22 (1953), the Court nevertheless reasoned that as the
government's immunity had been judicially created, it
could be judicially destroyed. A vigorous dissent pointed
out that the majority was usurping the legislative function
and ignoring stare decisis.
The abolishment of governmental immunity, as applied
to a political subdivision of a state, has traditionally been
considered a question for the legislature. E.g., Kilbourn
v. City of Seattle, 43 Wash. 2d 373, 261 P. 2d 407 (1953);
Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W. Va. 828, 30 S.E. 2d
726 (1944). But see, Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96
So. 2d 130, 60 A.L.R. 2d 1193 (Fla. 1957). The Maryland
Court of Appeals appears to be in accord with the majority
view. In State v. Baltimore County, 218 Md. 271, 146 A.
2d 28 (1958), a wrongftl death action was instituted to
recover damages for the slaying of the deceased by a
policeman employed by the defendant, Baltimore County.
After the trial court sustained defendant's demurrer without leave to amend, the plaintiff appealed. The Court of
Appeals unanimously affirmed the lower Court's action and
said, "If as the appellants argue, the rule [of immunity]
ought to be changed so as to enlarge the liability of municipal corporations, it must be done by the Legislature
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and not by this Court." (273) For further analysis see:
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L. J. 1
(1924); 60 A.L.R. 2d 1198 (1958); 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939);
Note,Liability of Municipal CorporationsUnder the State's
Statutory Waiver of Tort Immunity, 20 Md. L. Rev. 353
(1960).
Res Judicata - Wrongful Death Suit Bars Beneficiary's
Later Suit. Brinkman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,
111 Ohio App. 317, 172 N.E. 2d 154 (1960). Plaintiff and
her mother were passengers in an automobile which was
struck by defendant's train. The mother was killed. The
mother's administrator brought suit under the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute on behalf of plaintiff and other designated
beneficiaries, but failed to recover as defendant was found
not to have been negligent. Plaintiff later brought a separate suit for her personal injuries resulting from the
accident and defendant pleaded res judicata. Plaintiff contended that res judicata was not applicable because there
was not such an identity of parties in the two suits that
would bring into operation the principle of res judicata to
bar recovery. The Court of Appeals of Ohio held for defendant, stating that plaintiff, in addition to the other
beneficiaries, was the real party in interest in the wrongful
death action, thereby creating an identity of parties in both
suits sufficient to preclude recovery.
The weight of authority is that a matter is not res
judicataif there is no identity of persons and parties in the
respective actions. Garrison v. Bonham, 207 Okla. 599,
251 P. 2d 790 (1952); Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64
S.D. 274, 266 N.W. 256 (1936). In Gleaton v. Southern Ry.
Co., 212 S.C. 186, 46 S.E. 2d 879 (1948), a case dealing with
a prior survival action as distinguished from a prior action
for wrongful death, plaintiff sued defendant railroad for
damages to her car resulting from a collision at a train
crossing, in which plaintiff's husband was killed. The court,
in granting plaintiff a right to bring suit, said that she was
not barred from re-litigating the issue of defendant's negligence, although in a prior action under the survival statute
brought by the executor of decedent's estate, defendant
was found not negligent. The court reasoned that plaintiff
was not a real party in interest to the survival action, in as
much as the proceeds of any recovery in such a suit would
go, under the applicable law, to the estate of decedent to
pay claims and other expenses, with only the surplus, if
any, distributed to the legatees, including plaintiff.
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The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute, 6 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 67, § 4 states: "Every such action shall be for
the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused. . . ." Res
judicata in Maryland applies where there is identity of
parties or their privies, the latter including all those who
have a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit.
Ugast v. La Fontaine, 189 Md. 227, 55 A. 2d 705 (1947).
See also State, Use of Boshe v. Boyce, 72 Md. 140, 19 A.
366 (1890); Deford v. State, Use of Keyser, 30 Md. 179
(1869). Cases are collected in 125 A.L.R. 908 (1940). See
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) 402, § 85.
Workmen's Compensation Aggravation Of NonOccupational Disease Must Be By An Occupational Disease
To Be Compensable. Blake v. Bethlehem Steel Company,
........ Md .........
170 A. 2d 204 (1961). Claimant had a history of bronchitis prior to his employment by the respondent. While employed by the respondent, the claimant
worked as a pipe fitter in the area of an open hearth
furnace where he was subjected to extreme changes in
temperature and a certain amount of dust in the air. Now
totally disabled by a bronchial lung disease, claimant
asserted that twenty five per cent of his disability was
compensable, basing his claim on the section of the Maryland statute which allows compensation for that part of a
disability caused by an "occupational disease aggravating
other infirmity or contributing to disability or death." 8
MD. CODE (1957) Art. 101, § 22(c). Under the statute an occupational disease must be "due to the nature of an employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist
[and] are characteristic of and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment, and is actually incurred in his
employment." 8 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 101, § 23(c). An
award by the Workmen's Compensation Commission was
reversed by the trial court, and on appeal the claimant
contended that his pre-existing susceptibility had become "occupational" where it was aggravated by his occupational environment. Since the evidence failed to show
that chronic bronchitis was characteristic of the respondent's industry, and because the alleged aggravation did not
of itself amount to an occupational disease, the Court of
Appeals rejected the claimant's argument and in affirming
the trial court, held that the resulting condition was not
compensable.
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There is a split of authority among the states where, as
in the instant case, a pre-existing weakness is aggravated
by the conditions of employment, and the resultant disease
is not one peculiar to the employment. Cases allowing
compensation in such instances do so on the basis of liberal
construction of statutory definitions of occupational disease,
which provide compensation for diseases "arising out of
employment"; Giambattistav. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 32
N.J. Super. 103, 107 A. 2d 801 (1954); LeLenko v. Wilson
H. Lee Co., 128 Conn. 499, 24 A. 2d 253 (1942); Zallea
Brothers v. Cooper, 166 A. 2d 723 (Del. 1960). Denial of
compensation has been based on more restrictive statutory
definitions of occupational disease, which require a recognizable link between the disease and some distinctive
feature of the claimant's employment. Detenbeck v.
General Motors Corporation,309 N.Y. 558, 132 N.E. 2d 840
(1956). The Maryland Court, while aware of the trend
towards greater liberality in employee coverage, reasoned
that any change must be the result of legislative action.

See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1952)
§§ 41.60-41.62; 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1943) § 924; Cohen, Aggravation of Pre-existing conditions in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 20 J.B.A. Kan.
343 (1952); 60 A.L.R. 1299 (1929).

